¿Cuál Es El Costo De La Contaminación Ambiental Minera Sobre Los Recursos Hídricos En El Perú?
This study estimates the economic cost of mining pollution on water resources for the years 2008 and 2009 based on the conceptual framework of Environmental Efficiency (Pittman, 1981.1983, Färe et al., 1989, 1993, 2003; Rao, 2000). This framework understands such costs as the mining companies trade-off between increasing production that is saleable at market prices (desirable-output) and reducing environmental pollution that emerges from the production process (output-undesirable). These economic costs were calculated from parametric and nonparametric production possibility frontiers to 28 and 37 mining units in 2008 and 2009, respectively, which were under the purview of the National Campaign for Environmental Monitoring of Effluent and Water Resources conducted by Energy and Mining Investment Supervisory Agency (OSINERGMIN) in those years. The results show that the economic cost of mining pollution on water resources raised to $ 814.7 million and U.S. $ 448.8 million for 2008 and 2009, respectively. This economic cost was highly concentrated in a few mining units, within a few pollution parameters, and was also higher in mining units with average/low mineral production. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the Tobit regressions were not able to identify a pattern that explains the economic costs by using institutional, spatial and operational variables, which may be noted that it could be explained by factors related to the environmental management of mining production process. Taking into consideration that at present the fine and penalty system in the mining sector is based on an administrative-criteria, which does not fine for the potential environmental damage generated, the results of this study highlight the need to redesign this system based on an economic-criteria in order to establish a preventive mechanism of the pollution process in order to generate the necessary incentives for mining companies to address negative externalities that emerge from their production process.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, Lima, Perú|
Phone: (511) 626-2000 ext. 4950, 4951
Fax: (511) 626-2874
Web page: http://departamento.pucp.edu.pe/economia/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
- Richard Carson & Nicholas Flores & Norman Meade, 2001. "Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 173-210, June.
- Carson, Richard T & Flores, Nicholas A, 2000. "Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt75k752s7, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Post-Print halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Working Papers 2010.144, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Tsolas, Ioannis E., 2011. "Performance assessment of mining operations using nonparametric production analysis: A bootstrapping approach in DEA," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 159-167, June.
- Arturo Leonardo Vásquez Cordano & José David Gallardo Ku, 2006. "Sistema de Supervisión y Esquemas de Sanciones para el Sector Hidrocarburos," Working Papers 10, OSINERGMIN, Oficina de Estudios Economicos.
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, August.
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311120, October.
- Simar, Leopold & Wilson, Paul W., 2007. "Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models of production processes," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 31-64, January.
- Bockstael, Nancy E. & Freeman III, A. Myrick, 2006. "Welfare Theory and Valuation," Handbook of Environmental Economics,in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 12, pages 517-570 Elsevier.
- Fare, Rolf, et al, 1993. "Derivation of Shadow Prices for Undesirable Outputs: A Distance Function Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 374-380, May.
- Laffont,Jean-Jacques, 2005. "Regulation and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521840187, August.
- Laffont,Jean-Jacques, 2005. "Regulation and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521549486, October.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
- Hanemann, W Michael, 1991. "Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 635-647, June.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
- Emrouznejad, Ali & Parker, Barnett R. & Tavares, Gabriel, 2008. "Evaluation of research in efficiency and productivity: A survey and analysis of the first 30 years of scholarly literature in DEA," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 151-157, September.
- Aigner, Dennis & Lovell, C. A. Knox & Schmidt, Peter, 1977. "Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 21-37, July.
- Zhou, P. & Ang, B.W. & Poh, K.L., 2008. "Measuring environmental performance under different environmental DEA technologies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-14, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcp:pucwps:wp00321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.