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The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England

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  • Mark Koyama

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Abstract

Can the market provide law enforcement? This paper addresses this question by analyzing an historical case study: the system of private prosecutions that prevailed in England prior to the introduction of the police. I examine why this system came under strain during the Industrial Revolution, and how private clubs emerged to internalize the externalities that caused the private system to generate too little deterrence. The historical evidence suggests that these private order institutions were partially successful in ameliorating the problem of crime in a period when public choice considerations precluded the introduction of a professional police force. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:277-298
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0046-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:exehis:v:64:y:2017:i:c:p:1-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. William Luther, 2015. "The monetary mechanism of stateless Somalia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 45-58, October.
    3. repec:kap:pubcho:v:171:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0400-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics of crime; Private prosecutions; Club goods; Deterrence; Free-riding; K14; N43;

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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