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Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system

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  • Rosolino A. Candela

    () (George Mason University)

  • Vincent Geloso

    () (King’s College London)

Abstract

What is Coase’s understanding of transaction costs in economic theory and history? Our argument in this paper is twofold, one theoretical and the other empirical. First, Coase regarded positive transaction costs as the beginning, not the end, of any analysis of market processes. From a Coasean perspective, positive transaction costs represent a profit opportunity for entrepreneurs to erode such transaction costs, namely by creating gains from trade through institutional innovation. We demonstrate the practical relevance of entrepreneurship for reducing transaction costs by revisiting the case of the lightship at the Nore, an entrepreneurial venture which had arisen to erode the transaction costs associated with regulation by Trinity House, the main lighthouse authority of England and Wales. By intervening into the entrepreneurial market process, Trinity House would pave the way for the nationalization of the entire English and Welsh lighthouse system. By connecting our theoretical contribution with an empirical application, we wish to illustrate that Coase’s theoretical understanding of transaction costs is inherently linked to an empirical analysis of market processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 331-349, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:48:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-019-09635-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09635-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Candela, Rosolino A. & Geloso, Vincent, 2019. "Why consider the lighthouse a public good?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ronald Coase; Transaction costs; Lighthouses; Lightships;

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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