IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote


  • Barzel, Y


What could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.

Suggested Citation

  • Barzel, Y, 1997. "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Working Papers 97-13, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-13

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    2. Nelson, Charles R & Startz, Richard, 1990. "Some Further Results on the Exact Small Sample Properties of the Instrumental Variable Estimator," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 967-976, July.
    3. Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. & Moore, George R. & Schuh, Scott D., 1995. "Estimating the linear-quadratic inventory model Maximum likelihood versus generalized method of moments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 115-157, February.
    4. Newey, Whitney K & West, Kenneth D, 1987. "Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of Moments Estimation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 777-787, October.
    5. John Y. Campbell & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1989. "Consumption, Income and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 185-246 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hall, Robert E, 1988. "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 339-357, April.
    7. repec:fth:harver:1435 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
    9. D. Klepinger & S. Lundberg & R. Plotnick, "undated". "Instrument selection: The case of teenage childbearing and women's educational attainment," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1077-95, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
    10. Dufour, J.M., 1995. "Some Impossibility Theorems in Econometrics with Applications to Instrumental Variables, Dynamic Models and Cointegration," Cahiers de recherche 9539, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Phillips, P.C.B., 1983. "Exact small sample theory in the simultaneous equations model," Handbook of Econometrics,in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 449-516 Elsevier.
    12. Wang, J. & Zivot, E., 1996. "Inference of a Structural Parameter in Intrumental Variables Regression with weak Instruments," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 96-06, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    13. Hall, Alastair R & Rudebusch, Glenn D & Wilcox, David W, 1996. "Judging Instrument Relevance in Instrumental Variables Estimation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 283-298, May.
    14. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1984. "Interpreting the Statistical Failures of Some Rational Expectations Macroeconomic Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 188-193, May.
    15. Maddala, G S, 1974. "Some Small Sample Evidence on Tests of Significance in Simultaneous Equations Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 841-851, September.
    16. Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Keueger, 1991. "Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 979-1014.
    17. Shea, J., 1993. "Instrument Relevance in Linear Models: A Simple Measure," Working papers 9312, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Voigt, Stefan & Ebeling, Michael & Blume, Lorenz, 2007. "Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 348-373, March.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    3. Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury.
    4. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
    5. Voigt, Stefan, 2005. "Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 73, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.

    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Goldblatt). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.