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Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance

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    There are three steps New Zealand can take to make its bilateral development assistance more effective in reducing poverty. These steps are ‘easy’ because they are unilateral: they improve the effectiveness of development assistance without requiring changes in the politics or policies of developing countries. By far the most important of these three steps is to focus New Zealand’s bilateral aid on those poor countries that are democracies pursing policies of market-led growth. One of the major findings of recent research is that development aid only reinforces what is already there. New Zealand should accept the developing countries as it finds them and pick and choose so that it helps those already helping themselves.

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    File URL: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2001/01-26/twp01-26.pdf
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    Paper provided by New Zealand Treasury in its series Treasury Working Paper Series with number 01/26.

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    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26
    Contact details of provider: Postal: New Zealand Treasury, PO Box 3724, Wellington, New Zealand
    Phone: +64-4-472 2733
    Fax: +64-4-473 0982
    Web page: http://www.treasury.govt.nz

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