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Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance

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There are three steps New Zealand can take to make its bilateral development assistance more effective in reducing poverty. These steps are ‘easy’ because they are unilateral: they improve the effectiveness of development assistance without requiring changes in the politics or policies of developing countries. By far the most important of these three steps is to focus New Zealand’s bilateral aid on those poor countries that are democracies pursing policies of market-led growth. One of the major findings of recent research is that development aid only reinforces what is already there. New Zealand should accept the developing countries as it finds them and pick and choose so that it helps those already helping themselves.

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  • Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury.
  • Handle: RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26
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    File URL: https://treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2007-10/twp01-26.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    aid effectiveness; autocracy; democracy; development; New Zealand;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O2 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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