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Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships

We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous probaibility of "political catastrophe" that would extinguish the regime's wealth ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic capital the dictator plunders the country's resources and the economy shrinks. With high initial domestic capital the economy eventually grows faster than is socially optimal.

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File URL: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0311.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 03/11.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision: Dec 2003
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0311
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