The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic
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References listed on IDEAS
- Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 75-98, June.
- Robert C. Allen, 2003. "Progress and poverty in early modern Europe," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 56(3), pages 403-443, August.
- Barzel, Yoram, 1997. "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 455-474, December.
- Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Disunity of Unanimity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 83-94, June.
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- Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
- Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2013.
"Legal centralization and the birth of the secular state,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 959-978.
- Johnson, Noel D & Koyama, Mark, 2012. "Legal Centralization and the Birth of the Secular State," MPRA Paper 40887, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
More about this item
KeywordsPolish-Lithuanian Republic; Voting rules; Unanimity; Religious fractionalisation; D72; N43;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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