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Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

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  • Voigt, Stefan
  • Ebeling, Michael
  • Blume, Lorenz

Abstract

It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.
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  • Voigt, Stefan & Ebeling, Michael & Blume, Lorenz, 2007. "Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 348-373, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:82:y:2007:i:2:p:348-373
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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anne Aaken, 2009. "Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 296-322, September.
    2. Tom Ginsburg, 2009. "International delegation and state disaggregation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 323-340, September.
    3. repec:bpj:rlecon:v:13:y:2017:i:3:p:40:n:2 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dreher, Axel & Mikosch, Heiner & Voigt, Stefan, 2015. "Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 346-358.
    5. Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2007. "Warum beobachten wir so wenig Arbeitnehmer-Gewinnbeteiligung?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 94, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    6. Michaelis, Jochen, 2007. "Internationaler Handel," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 91, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    7. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    8. Schmidt, André, 2007. "Per-se-Rule, Rule of Reason und der "more economic approach"," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 92, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    9. Voigt, Stefan, 2012. "On the optimal number of courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 49-62.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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