Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally
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More about this item
KeywordsDelegation of Competence; Credibility; Dilemma of the Strong State; International Organizations;
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
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