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Constitutional judicial review and political insurance


  • George Tridimas



No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:29:y:2010:i:1:p:81-101 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-009-9112-z

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    3. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June.
    4. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    5. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    6. Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino, 2003. "Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-70, March.
    7. Voigt, Stefan & Salzberger, Eli M, 2002. "Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310.
    8. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:02:p:435-452_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ferejohn, John A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "A positive theory of statutory interpretation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 263-279, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lyttkens, Carl Hampus & Tridimas, George & Lindgren, Anna, 2017. "Making Direct Democracy Work. An economic perspective on the graphe paranomon in ancient Athens," Working Papers 2017:10, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    3. Eric Ip, 2014. "The judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: a public choice analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 221-247, April.
    4. Isabel-María García-Sánchez & Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros & José-Valeriano Frías-Aceituno, 2016. "Does media freedom improve government effectiveness? A comparative cross-country analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 515-537, December.
    5. George Tridimas, 2011. "A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 58-82, March.

    More about this item


    Judicial dispute resolution; Constitutional judicial review; Judicial independence; Political insurance; Binary choice/closed agenda; D72; D74; D78; K40; K41;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process


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