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Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

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  • Voigt, Stefan
  • Ebeling, Michael
  • Blume, Lorenz

Abstract

It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Voigt, Stefan & Ebeling, Michael & Blume, Lorenz, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 67, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kasvdb:67
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    Cited by:

    1. Tom Ginsburg, 2009. "International delegation and state disaggregation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 323-340, September.
    2. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.
    3. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    4. Michaelis, Jochen, 2007. "Internationaler Handel," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 91, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    5. Voigt, Stefan, 2012. "On the optimal number of courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 49-62.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Mikosch, Heiner & Voigt, Stefan, 2015. "Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 346-358.
    7. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2014. "Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 159-195, March.
    8. Schmidt, André, 2007. "Per-se-Rule, Rule of Reason und der "more economic approach"," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 92, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    9. Sofia Amaral-Garcia & Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Nuno Garoupa, 2020. "Consensus and Ideology in Courts: an Application to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Working Papers 430, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2020.
    10. Anne Aaken, 2009. "Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 296-322, September.
    11. Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2007. "Warum beobachten wir so wenig Arbeitnehmer-Gewinnbeteiligung?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 94, University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credibility; Delegation of Competence; Judicial Independence; Economic History; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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