Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002
This paper presents estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. We assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. We present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of our previous work, part of a research project on indicators initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999a,b and 2002). We also address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors. The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/.
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