IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpma/0308006.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Kaufmann

    (The World Bank)

  • Aart Kraay

    (The World Bank)

  • Massimo Mastruzzi

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

This paper presents estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. We assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. We present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of our previous work, part of a research project on indicators initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999a,b and 2002). We also address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors. The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Macroeconomics 0308006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0308006
    Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 116
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mac/papers/0308/0308006.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    2. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    3. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, 2002. "Growth without Governance," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 169-230, August.
    4. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1999. "Contract Intensive Money," MPRA Paper 25717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Aggregating governance indicators," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195, The World Bank.
    6. Djankov, S. & La Porta, R. & Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," Scholarly Articles 30747190, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    7. Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-292, April.
    8. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1999. "Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-211, June.
    9. Joel Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, 2003. "The Inequality of Influence," Development and Comp Systems 0308005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003. "Government matters III : governance indicators for 1996-2002," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3106, The World Bank.
    2. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2006. "Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Serkan Degirmenci, 2011. "Do Institutions Matter for Regional Economic Growth and Development? The Case of Turkey," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1374, European Regional Science Association.
    4. Serkan Degirmenci, 2011. "Do Institutions Matter for Regional Economic Growth and Development? The Case of Turkey," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1180, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2018. "Inefficient Growth," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 9(2).
    6. Casson, Mark C. & Della Giusta, Marina & Kambhampati, Uma S., 2010. "Formal and Informal Institutions and Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 137-141, February.
    7. Rohini Pande & Christopher Udry, 2005. "Institutions and Development:A View from Below," Working Papers 928, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    8. Loayza, Norman V. & Soto, Raimundo, 2004. "On the measurement of market-oriented reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3371, The World Bank.
    9. Mohamed Ismail Sabry, 2017. "Informal state–business connections, institutions, and economic growth," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(2), pages 233-258, August.
    10. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2019. "Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 240-292, July.
    11. Erica Bosio & Simeon Djankov & Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2022. "Public Procurement in Law and Practice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1117, April.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/o45fqtltm960r11iq437ski90 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Céline Azémar & Rodolphe Desbordes, 2009. "Public Governance, Health and Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 18(4), pages 667-709, August.
    14. Xu, Gang & Wang, Xue & Wang, Ruiting & Yano, Go & Zou, Rong, 2021. "Anti-corruption, safety compliance and coal mine deaths: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 458-488.
    15. Sazzadul Arefin, 2019. "Geographic Endowment, Corruption, and Economic Development," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(1), pages 1-32, March.
    16. Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge," MPRA Paper 8210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Utz Weitzel & Sjors Berns, 2006. "Cross-border takeovers, corruption, and related aspects of governance," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 37(6), pages 786-806, November.
    18. Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc‐Anh Do, 2009. "Instability And The Incentives For Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 42-92, March.
    19. Teuea Toatu, 2002. "Unravelling the Pacific Paradox," International and Development Economics Working Papers idec02-2, International and Development Economics.
    20. Sameeksha Desai & Zoltan J. Acs, 2007. "A Theory of Destructive Entrepreneurship," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-085, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    21. Jeffry Jacob & Thomas Osang, 2007. "Institutions, Geography and Trade: A Panel Data Study," Departmental Working Papers 0706, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Rule of Law; Transparency; Indicators; Data; Empirical; Corruption; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Aggregate; Voice; Accountability; Political Stability; Graft; Development; Violence; Crime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
    • C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
    • C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
    • C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0308006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.