Creating the Conditions for International Business Expansion: The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries - A Cross-Country Analysis
The role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development and therefore international business has generated considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years. In particular, building effective regulatory structures in developing countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the most appropriate regulatory instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and capacity. Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly provided and the effectiveness of these regulatory institutions can be expected to be an important determinant of how well markets function. This paper explores the role of regulation in affecting economic outcomes using an econometric model of the impact of regulatory governance. More precisely, it assesses through econometric modelling the impact of variations in the quality of regulatory governance on economic growth. Proxies for regulatory quality are included as determinants of economic growth. The results based on two different techniques of estimation suggest a strong causal link between regulatory quality and economic performance. The results confirm that "good" regulation is associated with higher economic growth, which in turn is conducive to the expansion of international business.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Harold Hankins Building, Precinct Centre, Booth Street West, Manchester, M13 9QH|
Web page: http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nazrul Islam, 1995. "Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1127-1170.
- Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1997.
"Aid, policies, and growth,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1777, The World Bank.
- Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin, 1999.
"Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780198774389, December.
- Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin & Lodge, Martin, 2011. "Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199576098, December.
- de Castro Alxandre Samy & Goldin, Ian & Pereira da Silva, Luiz A., 2002. "Relative returns to policy reform - evidence from controlled cross-country regressions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2898, The World Bank.
- David M. Newbery, 2002. "Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262640481, March.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart, 2002.
"Growth without governance,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2928, The World Bank.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, 2002. "Growth without Governance," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 169-230, August.
- Benhabib, Jess & Spiegel, Mark M., 1994. "The role of human capital in economic development evidence from aggregate cross-country data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 143-173, October.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
- Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995.
"Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1, 25th A), pages 1-118.
- Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
- Stern, Nicholas, 1991. "Public policy and the economics of development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(2-3), pages 241-271, April.
- D. Parker, 2002. "Economic Regulation: a review of issues," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 493-519, December.
- Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003.
"Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring Around the World,"
Research Department Publications
4329, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Alberto E. Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, 2003. "Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring around the World," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6507, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Chong, Alberto & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, 2002. "Privatization and labor force restructuring around the world," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2884, The World Bank.
- Guasch, J. Luis & Hahn, Robert W., 1997.
"The costs and benefits of regulation : implications for developing countries,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1773, The World Bank.
- Guasch, J Luis & Hahn, Robert W, 1999. "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 137-58, February.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Neumayer, Eric, 2002. "Is Good Governance Rewarded? A Cross-national Analysis of Debt Forgiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 913-930, June.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Aggregating governance indicators," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195, The World Bank.
- P. Cook, 1999. "Privatization and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: the Lessons So Far," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 549-587, December.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- Knight-John, Malathy, 2002. "The Institutional Policy Framework for Regulation and Competition in Sri Lanka," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30639, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
- repec:reg:rpubli:120 is not listed on IDEAS
- Walter Nonneman & Patrick Vanhoudt, 1996. "A Further Augmentation of the Solow Model and the Empirics of Economic Growth for OECD Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 943-953.
- M. Brownbridge & C. Kirkpatrick, 2000. "Financial Regulation in Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 1-24, October.
- Olson, Mancur, Jr & Sarna, Naveen & Swamy, Anand V, 2000. "Governance and Growth: A Simple Hypothesis Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Productivity Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 341-64, March.
- Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1999. "Contract Intensive Money," MPRA Paper 25717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- NONNEMAN, Walter & VANHOUDT, Patrick, 1995. "A further augmentation of the Solow model and the empirics of economic growth for OECD countries," SESO Working Papers 1995005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & David Romer & David N. Weil, 1990.
"A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth,"
NBER Working Papers
3541, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stern, Jon & Holder, Stuart, 1999. "Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems: An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 33-50, March.
- Estache, Antonio & Kouassi, Eugene, 2002. "Sector organization, governance, and the inefficiency of African water utilities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2890, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:idpmde:30554. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.