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Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England

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  • Edward Stringham

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  • Todd Zywicki

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Suggested Citation

  • Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:497-524
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9739-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Koyama, Mark, 2012. "The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England," MPRA Paper 40500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    3. Edward Stringham, 2014. "Extending the Analysis of Spontaneous Market Order to Governance," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(2), pages 171-180, June.
    4. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2013. "On the dynamics of legal convergence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 345-356, July.
    5. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, 2014. "On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-400.
    6. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2012. "Radical scholarship taking on the mainstream: Murray Rothbard’s contribution," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 315-327, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency of common law; Legal history; Monopolization of law; K40; N43; P48;

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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