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The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform

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  • George L. Priest

Abstract

This paper reviews the development of tort law during the 20th century with particular attention to the broad expansion of liability since the 1970s. It attempts to explain the origins of the expansion of liability; to present examples of its effects on product and service markets; and to analyze the extensive efforts of the past five to six years toward liability reform, efforts which I conclude have had only a slight relationship to the underlying sources of modern liability problems. Though the empirical evidence is thin, virtually all studies of the effects of specific modern rules demonstrate that modern tort law has substantially dislocated product and service markets, as one might expect of an assertive legal regime founded on largely noneconomic principles. As we shall see, market dislocations, especially for insurance, have increased sharply during the past decade.

Suggested Citation

  • George L. Priest, 1991. "The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 31-50, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:5:y:1991:i:3:p:31-50
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.3.31
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.5.3.31
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Turan, Nesve A. & Gow, Hamish R., 2004. "Firms, Incentives, And The Supply Of Food Safety: A Formal Model Of Government Enforcement," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20343, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Hsueh-Hsiang Li & Alexandra Bernasek, 2018. "Tort Reforms and the Gender Distribution of Physicians," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 437-454, June.
    3. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, 1994. "Insurance Rationing and the Origins of Workers' Compensation," NBER Working Papers 4943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Todd J. Zywicki & Edward P. Stringham, 2017. "Austrian law and economics and efficiency in the common law," Chapters, in: Todd J. Zywicki & Peter J. Boettke (ed.), Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, chapter 9, pages 192-208, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On tort as an implicit insurance system with state-dependent utility: The case of child mortality risk," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 449-459, December.
    6. Alberto Cavaliere, 2004. "Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 299-318, December.
    7. Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2020. "Evading Corporate Responsibilities: Evidence from the Shipping Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 15291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Randy A. Nelson & James N. Drews, 2008. "Strict Product Liability And Safety: Evidence From The General Aviation Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 425-437, July.
    9. Gietzmann, M. B. & Quick, R., 1998. "Capping auditor liability: The German experience," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 81-103, January.
    10. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
    11. Walter B. Kielholz, 2021. "Connecting the world’s risk and insurance communities: why research-based dialogue is more important than ever," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(2), pages 281-292, April.
    12. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.
    13. Frenzen, Paul D. & Buzby, Jean C. & Rasco, Barbara, 2001. "Product Liability And Microbial Foodborne Illness," Agricultural Economic Reports 34059, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    14. Cummins, J. David & Danzon, Patricia M., 1997. "Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 3-38, January.
    15. Winter, Ralph A., 2006. "Liability insurance, joint tortfeasors and limited wealth," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-14, March.
    16. Sjur Didrik Flåm & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2015. "Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 943-963, December.
    17. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, 2007. "Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-238.
    18. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
    19. Domenico Tosini, 2021. "Social immunology: A theory of the immune processes of social systems," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 50-60, January.
    20. Bartsch, Elga, 1996. "Enforcement of environmental liability in the case of uncertain causality and asymmetric information," Kiel Working Papers 755, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    21. Cooter, Robert D., 1997. "Commodifying Liability," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9pq4m8ts, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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