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Firms, Incentives, And The Supply Of Food Safety: A Formal Model Of Government Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Goldsmith, Peter D.
  • Turan, Nesve A.
  • Gow, Hamish R.

Abstract

Recent instances of significant food safety breeches in both meat and biotechnology challenge traditional safety efforts. A formal model utilizing agency theory is used to explore the power relationships between the regulator and the firm. Fundamental issues effecting firms' supply of safety are demonstrated and alternative corrective mechanisms are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldsmith, Peter D. & Turan, Nesve A. & Gow, Hamish R., 2004. "Firms, Incentives, And The Supply Of Food Safety: A Formal Model Of Government Enforcement," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20343, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20343
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20343
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    References listed on IDEAS

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