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Impact of liability rules on modes of coordination for food safety in supply chains

  • E. Rouvière

    ()

  • K. Latouche

    ()

This article analyzes how the allocation of liability for safety defects could influence coordination in the food supply chain. To do so, we analyzed the strategic reaction of importers and supermarkets who import Spanish fresh produce into France. We considered the implementation and enforcement of the European General Food Law as an exogenous shock for French food operators. In France, depending on the situation, food operators can transfer their liability to someone else in the food supply and imports decisions are crucial indicators. After 2005, supermarkets transferred the liability risk linked to importing sensitive products to importers. We argue that this regulatory change also prompted French importers of fresh produce to develop a horizontal, collective governance structure to monitor the safety of imported produce. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-013-9413-0
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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 37 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 111-130

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:37:y:2014:i:1:p:111-130
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