Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality
In this paper we focus specifically on the implications for additional traceability in the context of liability for food safety problems. We model formally the linkage between traceability and food safety and establish the implications of an increase in traceability-liability for food safety and related economic outcomes. The capacity to trace the origin of food increases the possibility of legal remedy and compensation in case of food safety event. Traceability also allows parties to more easily document that they are not responsible for harm. Therefore, traceability systems create incentives for firms to supply safer food.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||16 Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 2008, vol. 90 no. 1, pp. 15-27|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hobbs, Jill E., 2004. "Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector," Economic and Market Information 55304, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
- Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002.
"Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August.
- Brian Roe, 2004. "Optimal Sharing of Foodborne Illness Prevention between Consumers and Industry: The Effect of Regulation and Liability," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(2), pages 359-374.
- Golan, Elise H. & Krissoff, Barry & Kuchler, Fred & Calvin, Linda & Nelson, Kenneth E. & Price, Gregory K., 2004. "Traceability In The U.S. Food Supply: Economic Theory And Industry Studies," Agricultural Economics Reports 33939, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Buzby, Jean C. & Frenzen, Paul D., 1999. "Food safety and product liability," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 637-651, December.
- Jill E. Hobbs & DeeVon Bailey & David L. Dickinson & Morteza Haghiri, 2005. "Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector: Do Consumers Care?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 53(1), pages 47-65, 03.
- Frenzen, Paul D. & Buzby, Jean C. & Rasco, Barbara, 2001. "Product Liability And Microbial Foodborne Illness," Agricultural Economics Reports 34059, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genres:32126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Curtis Balmer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.