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Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products

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  • Julie A. Caswell
  • Eliza M. Mojduszka

Abstract

In the United States, the federal government is increasingly using requirements for informational labeling on food products to influence 1) consumers' knowledge and purchasing patterns and 2) manufacturers' product offerings and marketing practices. We discuss the economic rationale behind these regulations and issues related to judging their success or failure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, 1996. "Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1248-1253.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:78:y:1996:i:5:p:1248-1253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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