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Team versus individual reputations : a model of interaction and some empirical evidence




How do individuals, goods or services (e.g. researchers) through their own reputation give birth to a group's reputation (e.g. a laboratory) and conversely how do they take advantage of this group's reputation. Do they contribute to (derive benefit from) the group's reputation proportionally to their individual reputation or in a different way? To answer these questions we develop in this paper a theoretical model in which collective reputation both determines and is determined -simultaneously- by individual reputations as suggested first by Tirole (1996). This paper also proposes an empirical strategy to assess both umbrella impacts (the impact of a collective reputation on a given individual reputation) and contributions to the umbrella (the contrary). Then, the theoretical model is applied to the case of Bordeaux wines from a rich dataset on individual opinions.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gergaud & Florine Livat, 2004. "Team versus individual reputations : a model of interaction and some empirical evidence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla04015

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Andersson, Fredrik, 2002. "Pooling reputations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 715-730, May.
    2. Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 69-85, Fall.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    4. Steven Tadelis, 2003. "Firm reputation with hidden information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 635-651, March.
    5. Jay Pil Choi, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 655-669.
    6. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    8. Borenstein, Severin & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1988. "Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline Operation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 913-935, December.
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    11. Sullivan, Mary, 1990. "Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(3), pages 309-329, July.
    12. Choi, Jay Pil, 2003. "Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1179-1200, October.
    13. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    14. Choi, Chong Ju & Soo Hee Lee & Donghoon Oh, 1995. "The strategy of grouping and reputation linkage in clubs and multi-product firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 521-533, September.
    15. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    16. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 854-882, August.
    17. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance, 1998. "Quality expectations, reputation, and price," MPRA Paper 9774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kolavalli, Shashidhara & Birner, Regina & Flaherty, Kathleen, 2012. "The comprehensive Africa agriculture program as a collective institution:," IFPRI discussion papers 1238, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Roberta Sisto & Emilio De Meo & Antonio Lopolito, 2006. "Quality, Coordination and Collective Reputation in the San Severo Wine Production System," Quaderni DSEMS 17-2006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    3. Gergaud, Olivier & Livat, Florine, 2007. "How do consumers use signals to assess quality?," Working Papers 37296, American Association of Wine Economists.

    More about this item


    Individual reputation; collective reputation; cultural goods.;

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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