IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v21y2003i8p1179-1200.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products

Author

Listed:
  • Choi, Jay Pil

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Choi, Jay Pil, 2003. "Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1179-1200, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:8:p:1179-1200
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-7187(03)00077-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-450, June.
    2. Schmalensee, Richard, 1978. "A Model of Advertising and Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 485-503, June.
    3. Wujin Chu & Woosik Chu, 1994. "Signaling Quality by Selling Through a Reputable Retailer: An Example of Renting the Reputation of Another Agent," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 177-189.
    4. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    6. Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, 1988. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 673-694.
    7. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    8. Jay Pil Choi, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 655-669.
    9. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    10. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    11. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn.
    12. Carbajo, Jose & de Meza, David & Seidmann, Daniel J, 1990. "A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 283-298, March.
    13. Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W., 1994. "Middlemen as guarantors of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 509-531, December.
    14. K. Sridhar Moorthy & I. P. L. Png, 1992. "Market Segmentation, Cannibalization, and the Timing of Product Introductions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 345-359, March.
    15. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    16. Andrea Shepard, 1987. "Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 360-368, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sheikhzadeh, Mehdi & Elahi, Ehsan, 2013. "Product bundling: Impacts of product heterogeneity and risk considerations," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 209-222.
    2. Eric Rasmusen, 2011. "Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power," Working Papers 2011-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    3. Jungwoo Shin & Chang Seob Kimi & Jongsu Lee, 2009. "Model for Studying Commodity Bundling with a Focus on Consumer Preference," TEMEP Discussion Papers 200934, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Nov 2009.
    4. Olivier Gergaud & Florine Livat, 2004. "Team versus individual reputations : a model of interaction and some empirical evidence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. R. Scott Hiller, 2016. "The importance of quality: How music festivals achieved commercial success," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 40(3), pages 309-334, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:8:p:1179-1200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu) or (). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.