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You Are Judged by the Company You Keep: Reputation Leverage in Vertically Related Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jay Pil Choi

  • Martin Peitz

Abstract

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream firm. The supplier’s adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream firm has established a reputation for delivering high quality with the supplier. The supplier may enter the market by initially renting the downstream firm’s reputation. The downstream firm may optimally source its input externally, even though sourcing internally would be better in terms of productive efficiency. Since an entrant in the downstream market may lack reputation, it may suffer from a reputational barrier to entry arising from higher input costs–this constitutes a novel theory of downstream barriers to entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi & Martin Peitz, 2018. "You Are Judged by the Company You Keep: Reputation Leverage in Vertically Related Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_042, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_042
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp042
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    Cited by:

    1. Isadora Sánchez‐Torné & Juan Carlos Morán‐Álvarez & José A. Pérez‐López, 2020. "The importance of corporate social responsibility in achieving high corporate reputation," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(6), pages 2692-2700, November.
    2. de Jong, Gerben & Behrens, Christiaan & van Herk, Hester & Verhoef, Erik, 2022. "Airfares with codeshares: (why) are consumers willing to pay more for products of foreign firms with a domestic partner?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 1-18.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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