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Linking reputations through umbrella branding

  • Jeanine Miklós-Thal

    ()

This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. The analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11129-012-9118-7
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Quantitative Marketing and Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 335-374

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Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:10:y:2012:i:3:p:335-374
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-012-9118-7
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/marketing/journal/11129/PS2

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  17. Cabral, Luís M.B., 2009. "Umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 206-213, March.
  18. Sappington, David E M & Wernerfelt, Birger, 1985. "To Brand or Not to Brand? A Theoretical and Empirical Question," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 279-93, July.
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