IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Linking reputations through umbrella branding

  • Jeanine Miklós-Thal

    ()

This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. The analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11129-012-9118-7
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Quantitative Marketing and Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 335-374

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:10:y:2012:i:3:p:335-374
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111240

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Sappington, David E M & Wernerfelt, Birger, 1985. "To Brand or Not to Brand? A Theoretical and Empirical Question," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 279-93, July.
  2. Sullivan, Mary, 1990. "Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(3), pages 309-29, July.
  3. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
  5. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2006. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 132, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  7. Montgomery, Cynthia A & Wernerfelt, Birger, 1992. "Risk Reduction and Umbrella Branding," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 31-50, January.
  8. Choi, Jay Pil, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 655-69, October.
  9. Andersson, Fredrik, 2002. "Pooling reputations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 715-730, May.
  10. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  11. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
  12. Steve Tadelis, 1997. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," Working Papers 97033, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  13. Luis M.B. Cabral, 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 658-673, Winter.
  14. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March.
  15. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 131, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  17. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2008. "Umbrella Branding and External Certification," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  18. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn.
  19. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  20. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2010. "Quality Provision, Expected Firm Altruism and Brand Extensions," NBER Working Papers 15635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Lynne Pepall & Dan Richards, 1999. "The Simple Economics of "Brand-Stretching"," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9905, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  22. Cabral, Luís M.B., 2009. "Umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 206-213, March.
  23. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, March.
  24. Wolinsky, Asher, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 647-58, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:10:y:2012:i:3:p:335-374. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.