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Linking reputations through umbrella branding

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  • Jeanine Miklós-Thal

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Abstract

This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. The analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Linking reputations through umbrella branding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-374, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:10:y:2012:i:3:p:335-374 DOI: 10.1007/s11129-012-9118-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nadja Silberhorn & Yasemin Boztuğ & Lutz Hildebrandt, 2017. "Does umbrella branding really work? Investigating cross-category brand loyalty," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, pages 397-420.
    2. Sridhar Moorthy, 2012. "Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 756-770, September.
    3. Eric Rasmusen, 2011. "Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power," Working Papers 2011-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Zvika Neemam & Aniko Ory & Jungju Yu, 2016. "The Benefit of Collective Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2068, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation; Umbrella branding; Brand extensions; Signaling; Quality provision; L14; L15; M31;

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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