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Umbrella Branding and External Certification

  • Hendrik Hakenes

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Martin Peitz

    (University of Mannheim)

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.

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File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2008_10online.pdf
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2008_10.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_10
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  1. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-51, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universit├Ąt Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  2. Luis M. B. Cabral, 2001. "Optimal Brand Umbrella Size," Working Papers 01-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 458-466, Autumn.
  4. Luis Cabral, 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," Working Papers 00-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  6. Steve Tadelis, 1997. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," Working Papers 97033, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  7. Pil Choi, J., 1997. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," ISER Discussion Paper 0451, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  8. Cai, Hongbin, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6rk9f1fm, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  9. Andersson, Fredrik, 2002. "Pooling reputations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 715-730, May.
  10. Thomas L. Sporleder & Peter D. Goldsmith, 2001. "Alternative Firm Strategies for Signaling Quality in the Food System," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(4), pages 591-604, December.
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