Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability
We consider an industry where firms produce goods that have different quality levels but firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals. In this situation, producing low-quality generates a negative externality on the whole industry. This is particularly true when consumers cannot identify producers. In this article, we show that under a "Laissez Faire" situation free entry is not socially optimal and we argue that the imposition of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) may induce firms to enter the market.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992.
"Duopoly and Quality Standards,"
92.g, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Calvin, Linda, 2007. "Outbreak Linked to Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety Practices," Amber Waves, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June.
- Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
- Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
- Elodie Rouviere & Raphael Soubeyran & Céline Bignebat, 2010.
"Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety,"
European Review of Agricultural Economics,
Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 37(4), pages 479-499, December.
- Elodie Rouviere & Raphael Soubeyran & Céline Bignebat, 2010. "Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety," Post-Print hal-01323208, HAL.
- Nicolas Boccard & Xavier Wauthy, 2005.
"Enforcing Domestic Quality Dominance through Quotas,"
Review of International Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 250-261, 05.
- BOCCARD, Nicolas & WAUTHY, Xavier, "undated". "Enforcing domestic quality dominance through quotas," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1756, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jason A. Winfree & Jill J. McCluskey, 2005.
"Collective Reputation and Quality,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 206-213.
- Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-245, November.
- Paolo G. GARELLA & Emmanuel PETRAKIS, 2007.
"Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information,"
Departmental Working Papers
2007-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
- P. Garella & P. Petrakis, 2004. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 532, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.