Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition
L’objectif de cet article est d’étudier le lien entre un standard minimal de sécurité et la structure de concurrence entre producteurs. Un modèle théorique montre que le standard de sécurité et le nombre de producteurs dépendent de la structure d’information des consommateurs sur la sécurité. En situation d’information parfaite, le standard de sécurité maximisant le surplus collectif préserve la concurrence entre producteurs. A l’inverse, en situation d’information imparfaite, le standard de sécurité conduit à une situation de monopole.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/industrial+organization/journal/11149/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991.
"Duopoly and Quality Standards,"
Cahiers de recherche
9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Chan, Yuk-Shee & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-95, May.
- John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1982.
"Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power,"
NBER Working Papers
0937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Are Safety and Environmental Performance Standards Optimal Regulatory Instruments?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-79, September.
- P. Garella & P. Petrakis, 2004.
"Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information,"
532, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
- Paolo G. GARELLA & Emmanuel PETRAKIS, 2007. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Departmental Working Papers 2007-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991.
"High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Marino, Anthony M, 1998. "Regulation of Performance Standards versus Equipment Specification with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 5-18, July.
- Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November.
- Stephan Marette & John Crespi, 2005. "The Financing of Regulatory Agencies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-113, September.
- Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
- T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
- W. Kip Viscusi, 1996. "Economic Foundations of the Current Regulatory Reform Efforts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 119-134, Summer.
- Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
- Garella, Paolo G., 2006.
""Innocuous" minimum quality standards,"
Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 368-374, September.
- G. Ecchia & L. Lambertini, 1995.
"Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion,"
235, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Maxwell, John W., 1998. "Minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 355-360, March.
- Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Regulation of Product Safety Design through Product Testing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 255-76, May.
- H. Lutz, Stefan, 2000.
"Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry,"
Journal of Economic Integration,
Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 15, pages 314-344.
- Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1384, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marette, Stephan & Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Gozlan, Estelle, 2000. "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 426-41, December.
- Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February.
- Constantatos, Christos & Perrakis, Stylianos, 1998. "Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-58, January.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:259-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.