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Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition

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  • Stéphan Marette

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Abstract

L’objectif de cet article est d’étudier le lien entre un standard minimal de sécurité et la structure de concurrence entre producteurs. Un modèle théorique montre que le standard de sécurité et le nombre de producteurs dépendent de la structure d’information des consommateurs sur la sécurité. En situation d’information parfaite, le standard de sécurité maximisant le surplus collectif préserve la concurrence entre producteurs. A l’inverse, en situation d’information imparfaite, le standard de sécurité conduit à une situation de monopole.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:259-285
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9036-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
    2. Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
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    7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    8. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Are Safety and Environmental Performance Standards Optimal Regulatory Instruments?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-179, September.
    9. Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-245, November.
    10. H. Lutz, Stefan, 2000. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 15, pages 314-344.
    11. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    12. Stephan Marette & John Crespi, 2005. "The Financing of Regulatory Agencies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-113, September.
    13. Ecchia, Giulio & Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 101-113, March.
    14. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-195, May.
    15. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Regulation of Product Safety Design through Product Testing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 255-276, May.
    16. Marette, Stephan & Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Gozlan, Estelle, 2000. "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 426-441, December.
    17. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
    18. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    19. Constantatos, Christos & Perrakis, Stylianos, 1998. "Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-58, January.
    20. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    21. Maxwell, John W., 1998. "Minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 355-360, March.
    22. W. Kip Viscusi, 1996. "Economic Foundations of the Current Regulatory Reform Efforts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 119-134, Summer.
    23. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-432, October.
    24. Marino, Anthony M, 1998. "Regulation of Performance Standards versus Equipment Specification with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 5-18, July.
    25. John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
    26. Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February.
    27. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-348, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2015. "Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 622-640, December.
    3. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2015. "On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(1), pages 239-259.
    4. Stefan Napel & Gunnar Oldehaver, 2011. "A dynamic perspective on minimum quality standards under Cournot competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 29-49, February.
    5. Stéphan Marette & Jutta Roosen & Sandrine Blanchemanche, 2008. "Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 119-143, October.
    6. repec:wsi:wschap:9789813144415_0013 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. John C. Beghin & Anne-Celia Disdier & Stéphan Marette, 2017. "The Economics and Potential Protectionism of Food Safety Standards and Inspections: An Application to the U.S. Shrimp Market," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 13, pages 209-237 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. repec:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9347-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9346-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Bonroy, Olivier & Lemarié, Stéphane, 2012. "Downstream labeling and upstream price competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 347-360.
    11. Marette, Stéphan & Messéan, Antoine & Millet, Guy, 2012. "Consumers’ willingness to pay for eco-friendly apples under different labels: Evidences from a lab experiment," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-161.
    12. repec:kap:jeczfn:v:121:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-017-0527-7 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information; Market structure; Safety; Standard; L1; L5;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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