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Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition

  • Stéphan Marette


L’objectif de cet article est d’étudier le lien entre un standard minimal de sécurité et la structure de concurrence entre producteurs. Un modèle théorique montre que le standard de sécurité et le nombre de producteurs dépendent de la structure d’information des consommateurs sur la sécurité. En situation d’information parfaite, le standard de sécurité maximisant le surplus collectif préserve la concurrence entre producteurs. A l’inverse, en situation d’information imparfaite, le standard de sécurité conduit à une situation de monopole.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 259-285

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:259-285
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  3. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
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  5. Constantatos, Christos & Perrakis, Stylianos, 1998. "Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-58, January.
  6. Marette, Stephan & Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Gozlan, Estelle, 2000. "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 426-41, December.
  7. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Are Safety and Environmental Performance Standards Optimal Regulatory Instruments?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-79, September.
  8. H. Lutz, Stefan, 2000. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 15, pages 314-344.
  9. Marino, Anthony M, 1998. "Regulation of Performance Standards versus Equipment Specification with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 5-18, July.
  10. Maxwell, John W., 1998. "Minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 355-360, March.
  11. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Ecchia, Giulio & Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 101-13, March.
  13. Paolo G. GARELLA & Emmanuel PETRAKIS, 2007. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Departmental Working Papers 2007-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  14. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  15. John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
  16. W. Kip Viscusi, 1996. "Economic Foundations of the Current Regulatory Reform Efforts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 119-134, Summer.
  17. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
  18. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Regulation of Product Safety Design through Product Testing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 255-76, May.
  19. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-95, May.
  20. Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  21. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1982. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," NBER Working Papers 0937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  23. Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November.
  24. Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February.
  25. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
  26. Stephan Marette & John Crespi, 2005. "The Financing of Regulatory Agencies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-113, September.
  27. Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
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