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Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents

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  • Van den Steen, Eric

Abstract

This paper shows why, in a world with differing priors, rational agents tend to attribute their own success more to skill and their failure more to bad luck than an outsider. It further shows why each agent in a group might think he or she is the best, why an agent might overestimate the control he has over the outcome, and why two agents? estimated contributions often add up to more than 100%. Underlying all these phenomena is a simple and robust mechanism that endogenously generates overoptimism about one?s own actions. The paper also shows how these biases hinder learning and discusses some implications for organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Van den Steen, Eric, 2002. "Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents," Working papers 4255-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:1684
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anat Bracha & Elke U. Weber, 2012. "A psychological perspective of financial panic," Public Policy Discussion Paper 12-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Kirman, Alan & Marsili, Matteo, 2011. "Born under a lucky star?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 382-392, March.
    3. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Confidence-Enhanced Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1536-1557, December.
    4. Chen, XiaoHua & Lai, Yun-Ju, 2015. "On the concentration of mutual fund portfolio holdings: Evidence from Taiwan," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 268-286.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel, 2003. "Learning and self-confidence in contests [Lernen und Selbstvertrauen in Wettkämpfen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-10, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Alexander Meschkowski, "undated". "The Economics Of D&O Liability For False Information In German Secondary Capital Markets," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1135, Berkeley Electronic Press.

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