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Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory

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  • Glenn Ellison

Abstract

This paper develops models of quality standards to examine two trends: academic journals increasingly require extensive revisions of submissions, and articles are becoming longer and changing in other ways. Papers are modeled as varying along two quality dimensions: q reflects the importance of the main ideas and r other aspects of quality. Observed trends are regarded as increases in r-quality. A static equilibrium model illustrates comparative statics explanations. A dynamic model in which referees (with a biased view of their own work) learn social norms for weighting q and r is shown to produce a long, gradual evolution of social norms.

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  • Glenn Ellison, 2002. "Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 994-1034, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:5:p:994-1034
    DOI: 10.1086/341871
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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