Hyper-stable social welfare functions
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stergios, Athanasoglou, 2017. "An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation," Working Papers 363, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2017.
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019.
"Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 225-246, February.
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Post-Print hal-02510491, HAL.
- Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "Metrizable preferences over preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 177-191, June.
- Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2016. "Comparing preference orders: Asymptotic independence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 1-5.
- Katherine Baldiga Coffman, 2016. "Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 477-494, March.
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