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M. Remzi Sanver

Personal Details

First Name:Remzi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Sanver
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RePEc Short-ID:psa232
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.remzisanver.com

Affiliation

Laboratoire d'Analyse et Modélisation de Systèmes pour l'Aide à la Décision (LAMSADE)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/
RePEc:edi:lamp9fr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books

Working papers

  1. Ali Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2023. "Uniform Random Dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness ," Post-Print hal-04308099, HAL.
  2. Ozdemir, Ugur & Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, Remzi, 2023. "Ability or motivation? Voter registration and turnout in Burkina Faso," OSF Preprints x5wbj, Center for Open Science.
  3. M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray," Post-Print hal-03767266, HAL.
  4. Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Post-Print hal-03665048, HAL.
  5. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2022. "Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections," Post-Print hal-03767264, HAL.
  6. Denis Bouyssou & M Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Simple but powerful models of stereotype formation ," Post-Print hal-03766376, HAL.
  7. Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print hal-03498370, HAL.
  8. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Post-Print hal-03347632, HAL.
  9. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains," Post-Print hal-03464586, HAL.
  10. Ali Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Post-Print hal-03341695, HAL.
  11. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2021. "Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules," Post-Print hal-03250759, HAL.
  12. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "Metrizable preferences over preferences," Post-Print hal-03271221, HAL.
  13. Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Post-Print hal-03092402, HAL.
  14. M. Remzi Sanver & William Zwicker & Hervé Moulin & Jean-François Laslier, 2019. "The Future of Economic Design," Post-Print hal-02517300, HAL.
  15. Jean-François Laslier & Hervé Moulin & M Remzi Sanver, 2019. "The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers," Post-Print halshs-02489653, HAL.
  16. Vincent Merlin & Ipek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Post-Print halshs-02065282, HAL.
  17. M. Remzi Sanver & Martin Osborne & Sean Horan, 2019. "Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives," Post-Print hal-02517283, HAL.
  18. M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto," Post-Print hal-02517252, HAL.
  19. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence," Post-Print hal-02517236, HAL.
  20. Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Post-Print hal-02517227, HAL.
  21. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited," AMSE Working Papers 1736, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  22. Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver & Shin Sato, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Post-Print hal-02517255, HAL.
  23. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," AMSE Working Papers 1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  24. Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Hyper-stable social welfare functions," Post-Print hal-01505809, HAL.
  25. Bora Erdamar & José Luis Garcia-Lapresta & David Pérez-Roman & Remzi Sanver, 2012. "Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context," Working Papers hal-00681297, HAL.
  26. Shurojit Chatterji & Remzi Sanver & Arunava Sen, 2010. "On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 07-2010, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  27. Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence," Working Papers 201005, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
  28. Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Working Papers 0107, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.

    repec:hal:journl:hal-03341697 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2023. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 547-560, September.
  2. M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 247-254, September.
  3. Denis Bouyssou & M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Simple but Powerful Models of Stereotype Formation," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 73(6), pages 1055-1068.
  4. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2022. "Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 305-333, August.
  5. Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 421-441, February.
  6. Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "Correction to: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 115-115, July.
  7. Kruger, Justin & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2021. "The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 95-97.
  8. Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 97-113, July.
  9. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 535-555, October.
  10. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2021. "Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
  11. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  12. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "Metrizable preferences over preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 177-191, June.
  13. Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, February.
  14. Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules And Majority Rule: A Generalization Of May'S Theorem To Many Alternatives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1489-1504, November.
  15. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 563-575, October.
  16. Kruger, Justin & Remzi Sanver, M., 2018. "Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 32-34.
  17. M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 223-233, April.
  18. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.
  19. Ozkes, Ali Ihsan & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 20-22.
  20. M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(1), pages 65-72, March.
  21. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
  22. Jean Lainé & Ali Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Hyper-stable social welfare functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 157-182, January.
  23. Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
  24. Ceyhun Coban & M. Sanver, 2014. "Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 953-961, December.
  25. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava, 2013. "On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1050-1073.
  26. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
  27. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
  28. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2011. "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 431-446, December.
  29. Sanver, M. Remzi & Selçuk, Özer, 2010. "A characterization of the Copeland solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 354-355, June.
  30. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2010. "A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 439-452, September.
  31. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
  32. Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
  33. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Remzi Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2009. "Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 37-61.
  34. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2009. "One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 553-574, November.
  35. Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "Stereotype formation as trait aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 226-237, September.
  36. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
  37. M. Sanver & Özer Selçuk, 2009. "Sophisticated preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 73-86, June.
  38. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
  39. Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Choosers as extension axioms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 375-384, October.
  40. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
  41. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January.
  42. Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April.
  43. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2008. "Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 298-300, May.
  44. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2007. "Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 439-442, April.
  45. Dogan, Emre & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "On the alternating use of "unanimity" and "surjectivity" in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 140-143, July.
  46. Benoit, Jean Pierre & Ok, Efe A. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "On combining implementable social choice rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 20-30, July.
  47. Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
  48. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 257-260, December.
  49. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  50. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June.
  51. M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 453-460, June.
  52. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
  53. Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
  54. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August.
  55. M. Remzi Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2005. "Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(31), pages 1.
  56. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
  57. M. Sanver, 2005. "Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(4), pages 307-316, December.
  58. Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October.
  59. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
  60. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 375-380, July.
  61. Barış Kaymak & M. Remzi Sanver, 2003. "Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 477-494, June.
  62. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
  63. M. Remzi Sanver, 2002. "An Allocation Rule with Wealth‐Regressive Tax Rates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 63-69, January.
  64. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 151-155, March.
  65. Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 1999. "Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-162, June.

Chapters

  1. İpek Özkal-Sanver & Pelin Pasin & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Constanze Binder & Giulio Codognato & Miriam Teschl & Yongsheng Xu (ed.), Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, edition 127, pages 127-141, Springer.
  2. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver, 2010. "Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 1-12, Springer.
  3. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver, 2010. "The Basic Approval Voting Game," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 153-163, Springer.
  4. M. Remzi Sanver, 2010. "Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 469-481, Springer.
  5. Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, pages 215-237, Springer.
  6. D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver, 2006. "How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 83-95, Springer.

Books

  1. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, June.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

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  1. Turkish Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 20 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2013-10-18 2017-03-19 2017-04-23 2017-10-22 2018-04-23 2019-07-15 2019-11-25 2022-10-31. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (7) 2010-07-17 2012-04-03 2018-04-23 2019-04-01 2021-12-13 2022-10-03 2023-12-18. Author is listed
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (4) 2021-09-27 2021-12-13 2022-10-03 2023-12-18
  4. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (3) 2021-09-27 2021-09-27 2021-09-27
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2018-04-23 2019-07-15
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2019-07-15 2019-11-25
  7. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2017-10-22
  8. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2022-07-18
  9. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2022-01-17
  10. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (1) 2010-07-17

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