Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
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Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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- Joaqui´n Pérez, 2001. "The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 601-616.
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- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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