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An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences

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  • José Jimeno
  • Joaquín Pérez
  • Estefanía García

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  • José Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez & Estefanía García, 2009. "An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 343-359, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:343-359
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Brandt, Felix & Geist, Christian & Peters, Dominik, 2017. "Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 18-27.
    2. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    3. Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou, 2021. "Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 275-295, Springer.
    4. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2012. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 291-303, May.
    5. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.
    6. Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Hofbauer, Johannes, 2019. "Welfare maximization entices participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 308-314.
    7. Jimeno, José L. & García, Estefanía & Pérez, Joaquín, 2011. "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-27, July.
    8. Felix Brandt & Chris Dong & Dominik Peters, 2024. "Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates," Papers 2411.19857, arXiv.org.
    9. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting," Papers 2106.11502, arXiv.org.
    10. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
    11. Estefanía García & José L. Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez, 2013. "New Voting Correspondences Obtained from a Distance-Based Framework," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 379-388, May.
    12. Can, Burak & Ergin, Emre & Pourpouneh, Mohsen, 2017. "Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    13. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 1-62, October.
    14. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2015. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-513, May.
    15. Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou, 2019. "Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems," Working Papers hal-02185965, HAL.
    16. Martin Bullinger & Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer & Clara Mehler, 2023. "Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections," Papers 2312.08798, arXiv.org.
    17. Karel Kouba & Michael Haman, 2021. "When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 279-300, October.
    18. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    19. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Faty Mbaye Top, 2023. "Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate," Working Papers hal-03143741, HAL.
    20. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers," Papers 2004.02350, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    21. Guillaume Chèze, 2017. "Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 707-715, April.

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