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An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • José Jimeno

    ()

  • Joaquín Pérez

    ()

  • Estefanía García

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6
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Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 343-359

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:343-359
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/scw/

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
  2. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
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Cited by:

  1. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
  2. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
  3. repec:spr:grdene:v:22:y:2013:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9271-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
  5. repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9416-4 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9191-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. repec:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1032-1 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Matías Núñez & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Revisiting The Connection Between The No-Show Paradox And Monotonicity ," Working Papers hal-01276072, HAL.
  9. Jimeno, José L. & García, Estefanía & Pérez, Joaquín, 2011. "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-27, July.

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