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An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • José Jimeno

    ()

  • Joaquín Pérez

    ()

  • Estefanía García

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • José Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez & Estefanía García, 2009. "An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 343-359, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:343-359
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:18-27 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    3. repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9191-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:9-17 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jimeno, José L. & García, Estefanía & Pérez, Joaquín, 2011. "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-27, July.
    6. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
    7. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    8. repec:spr:grdene:v:22:y:2013:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9271-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Can, Burak & Ergin, Emre & Pourpouneh, Mohsen, 2017. "Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    10. repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9416-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1032-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.

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