Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001|
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