Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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- Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Multi-valued decision rules and coalitional non-manipulability : Two possibility theorems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 37-44.
- Shin Sato, 2008. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 331-343, August.
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"Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394],"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
- Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 359-363, April.
- Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Manipulation of non-imposed, non-oligarchic, non-binary group decision rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 69-73.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987.
Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-74, September.
- Peleg,Bezalel, 2008.
"Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650, October.
- Barbera, Salvador, 1977. "Manipulation of social decision functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 266-278, August.
- Feldman, Allan, 1979. "Manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 473-482, December.
- Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "A trade-off result for preference revelation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-141, August.
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