Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
A minimal reduction in strategic voter’s knowledge about other voters’ voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem about strategic voter‘s complete information about all other voters’ preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in the number of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relative reduction in amount of information.
Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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