In Silico Voting Experiments
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial Choice. Voting Rules. Impartial Culture. Condorcet. Borda;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2009-06-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2009-06-03 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-HPE-2009-06-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-06-03 (Positive Political Economics)
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