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In Silico Voting Experiments

Author

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00390376 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00390376
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    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00390376/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 256-270.
    3. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.
    4. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    5. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 909-928.
    6. Michel Truchon, 2006. "Borda and the Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation," Cahiers de recherche 0623, CIRPEE.
    7. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais, 2002. "Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation," Post-Print halshs-00069522, HAL.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:04:p:856-869_10 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
    10. Mohamed Drissi-Bakhkhat & Michel Truchon, 2004. "Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 161-185.
    11. Truchon, Michel, 2008. "Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 96-102, January.
    12. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ján Palguta, 2011. "Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 324-345, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Choice. Voting Rules. Impartial Culture. Condorcet. Borda;

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