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Vote Bying I: General Elections

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  • Eddie Dekel
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Asher Wolinksy

Abstract

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al- lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec- tion. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinksy, 2006. "Vote Bying I: General Elections," Discussion Papers 1434, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1434
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    vote buying; political economy; campaign promises.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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