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Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders

  • Alessandra Casella
  • Thomas Palfrey
  • Sébastien Turban

Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17847.

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Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Public Economics Volume 112, April 2014, Pages 115–128 Cover image Vote trading with and without party leaders ☆ Alessandra Casellaa, b, c, , , Thomas Palfreyb, d, , Sébastien Turband,
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17847
Note: POL
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