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Centralized vote-trading

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  • Kenneth Koford

Abstract

This paper presents a model of centralized vote-trading in a legislature. In this model, legislators trade only with party leaders, who set prices at which they will buy needed vote-changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills. Each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders, and purchases promises from the leaders to pass (or defeat) particular bills of high concern to the legislator, relative to the price the leguslator must pay. This model is intended as a formal representation of an ‘efficient’ and possibly desirable legislature; modifications are needed to make it useful in describing actual legislatures. However, some evidence is cited to show that this model better accords with reality than previous vote-trading models. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:2:p:245-268
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00162117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Holcombe, 1989. "A note on seniority and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 285-288, June.
    2. Kenneth Koford, 1994. "What Can We Learn About Congressional Politics From Dimensional Studies Of Roll‐Call Voting?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 173-186, July.
    3. Jon X. Eguia, 2013. "The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 313-334, November.
    4. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.
    5. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2021. "Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1849-1882.
    6. Stephen Hoenack, 1983. "On the stability of legislative outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 251-260, January.

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