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Vote trading in power-sharing systems: A laboratory investigation

Author

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  • Nikolas Tsakas
  • Dimitrios Xefteris
  • Nicholas Ziros

Abstract

Vote trading in power-sharing systems—i.e., systems in which a voter’s utility with respect to the election’s outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party—is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters’ preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently lose from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2018. "Vote trading in power-sharing systems: A laboratory investigation," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 13-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, revised 25 Jul 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucy:cypeua:13-2018
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    vote trading; power sharing; experiment; social welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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