Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.010
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- Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Taalaibekova, Akylai, 2019.
"Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 9-27.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2018. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01720017, HAL.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02195926, HAL.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2018. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Post-Print halshs-01720017, HAL.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02195926, HAL.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Post-Print hal-02195926, HAL.
- Agnieszka Rusinowka & Akylai Taalaibekova, 2018. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18005, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018.
"Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 341-359, September.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2016, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- DeAngelo, Gregory & Houser, Daniel & Romaniuc, Rustam, 2020. "Experimental public choice: An introduction to the special issue," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 278-280.
- Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber & Alexei Zakharov, 2019.
"Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 713-753, September.
- Alexei, Zakharov & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2016. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 11527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Electoral competition; Entry; Third party; Spatial model; Experiment;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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