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Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy

In: The Political Economy of Social Choices

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Bol

    (King’s College London)

  • Arnaud Dellis

    (Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Mandar Oak

    (University of Adelaide)

Abstract

This article surveys the latest advances in the literature on the comparative properties of different voting procedures in the context of political elections. In particular, we focus on the various attempts at understanding how different voting procedures affect the number of candidates and the positions they adopt. In public debate as well as academic scholarship, the comparative properties of different voting procedures has been a topic of enduring interest. This interest dates as far back as the late eighteenth century French philosopher-mathematicians Condorcet and Borda (and even earlier with the works of Lull and Cusanus), building up to the classic works of Arrow, May and Gibbard-Satthertwaite in the mid-twentieth century. The work in this tradition is largely confined to a rather abstract treatment of voting procedures, over an exogenously given set of alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-40118-8_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40118-8_2
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    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-17, June.
    2. Dodge Cahan & Arkadii Slinko, 2018. "Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 259-279, August.
    3. Ružica Savčić & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Apostolic voting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 1400-1417, November.
    4. Elbittar, Alexander & Gomberg, Andrei & Trujano-Ochoa, Dario, 2024. "Citizen candidates in the lab: Rules, costs, and positions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    5. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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