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Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation

Author

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  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

    (University of Birmingham)

  • Mandar Oak

    (Williams College)

Abstract

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where 'citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding o±ce and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.

Suggested Citation

  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation," Discussion Papers 04-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:04-04
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    proportional representation; party formation; coalitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other

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