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Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

  • Frederico Finan
  • Claudio Ferraz

    ()

Using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments this paper examines whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population.

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Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1889.

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Date of creation: Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1889
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