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Intrinsic Motivation and Incentives

Author

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  • Canice Prendergast

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Canice Prendergast, 2008. "Intrinsic Motivation and Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 201-205, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:201-05
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.201
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marta De Philippis, 2015. "Multitask agents and incetives: the case of teaching and research for university professors," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1042, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Simona Grassi & Ching-To Albert Ma, 2015. "Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    3. Walter Buhr, 2009. "Infrastructure of the Market Economy," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 132-09, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    4. Lea Cassar, 2014. "Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission," ECON - Working Papers 150, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2014.
    5. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016. "Optimal task assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
    6. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Boyer, 2013. "Welfare programs and motivation bias of social workers," 2013 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2008. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 3411, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Grabner, Isabella & Speckbacher, Gerhard, 2016. "The cost of creativity: A control perspective," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 31-42.
    9. F. Barigozzi & N. Burani, 2013. "Bidimensional screening with intrinsically motivated workers," Working Papers wp866, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    10. Onishi, Koichiro, 2013. "The effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on R&D productivity: New evidence from Japanese panel data," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 367-378.
    11. Akerlof, Robert, 2016. "Anger and enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PB), pages 110-124.
    12. Elliott Ash, W. Bentley MacLeod, . "Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    13. F. Barigozzi & N. Burani, 2014. "Competition and Screening with Skilled and Motivated Workers," Working Papers wp953, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    14. Benno Torgler & Bruno S.Frey & Markus Schaffner & Sascha L.Schmidt, 2008. "A Crowding-Out Effect for Relative Income," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 236, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    15. Liu, Taoxiong & Zhou, Bihua, 2011. "Commitment and optimal incentive," MPRA Paper 35550, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Dec 2011.
    16. Alexandros Karakostas & Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2013. "Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    17. Cordella, Antonio & Cordella, Tito, 2017. "Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 236-255.
    18. Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2013. "Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 79-96.
    19. Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2013. "Intrinsic Motivation in the Labor Market: Not Too Much, Thank You," AICCON Working Papers 124-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    20. Claudio Lucifora, 2015. "Performance-related pay and labor productivity," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 152-152, May.
    21. Belenzon, Sharon & Schankerman, Mark, 2008. "Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51594, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    22. Ting Liu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Henry Y. Mak, 2017. "Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2018-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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