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Incumbent performance and electoral control

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  • John Ferejohn

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Suggested Citation

  • John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:50:y:1986:i:1:p:5-25
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124924
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McKelvey, Richard D, 1975. "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(5-6), pages 815-843, Sept.-Nov.
    2. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    4. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    5. Chappell, Henry W. & Keech, William R., 1985. "A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 10-27, March.
    6. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
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