A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003. "A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy," CEIS Research Paper 21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
References listed on IDEAS
- van Damme, Eric, 1989.
"Stable equilibria and forward induction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Other publications TiSEM bd598a8f-f017-4cab-a9ed-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Other publications TiSEM e4c0a7ec-55b2-474c-8dae-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004.
"When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
- Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," Economic Research Papers 269298, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000.
"Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992.
"The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1990. "The "small worlds" axiom for stable equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1990007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Jean-François Mertens, 1989.
"Stable Equilibria---A Reformulation,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 575-625, November.
- Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February.
- Amrita Dhillon & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen‐Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-184, April.
- Govindan Srihari, 1995.
"Stability and the Chain Store Paradox,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 536-547, August.
- GOVINDAN, Srihari, 1992. "Stability and the chain store paradox," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1989. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation. Part I. Definition and basic properties," LIDAM Reprints CORE 866, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francesco De sinopoli & Alessandro Turrini, 2002.
"A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 163-170, April.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 2002. "A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1562, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:171-84 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1986. "On the strategic stability of equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016.
"Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy,"
Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54,
Springer.
- Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018. "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 275-293.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2013.
"Electing a parliament,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 715-737, March.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Ferraris, Leo, 2007. "Electing a parliament," UC3M Working papers. Economics we073319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Electing a Parliament," Working Papers 150, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003.
"From evolutionary to strategic stability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
- DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008.
"Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs,"
Research Papers
2000, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004.
"When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," Economic Research Papers 269298, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2022. "The Trembling Chairman Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 51-56.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 824-834, October.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009.
"On Forward Induction,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, January.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001859, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "'On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000825, David K. Levine.
- GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012.
"Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two‐Player Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1639-1699, July.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games," Research Papers 2021, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020.
"Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Post-Print halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Justification of Stable Equilibria," Research Papers 1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- John Hillas & Mathijs Jansen & Jos Potters & Dries Vermeulen, 2001. "On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(3), pages 611-635, August.
- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009.
"Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2008. "Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP52, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008.
"Metastable Equilibria,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 787-820, November.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Metastable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001211, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Metastable Equilibria," Research Papers 1934r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021.
"Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
- Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
More about this item
Keywords
Voting games; refinements of Nash equilibrium; citizen-candidate; forward induction; Mertens’ stable sets;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.