Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections
We consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary voter indifferences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen-candidate or locational models of elections. We prove that the voting game admits pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. The proof is constructive: we exhibit an algorithm, the "best winning deviation" algorithm, that produces such an equilibrium in finite time. A byproduct of the algorithm is a simple story for how voters might learn to coordinate on such an equilibrium. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 2004. "Comparative Learning Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 431-465, 05.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
1995-01, McMaster University.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, .
"A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1562, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Turrini, Alessandro, 2002. " A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 163-70.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:875-889. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.