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Ideology and competence in alternative electoral systems

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  • Iaryczower, Matias
  • Mattozzi, Andrea

Abstract

We develop a model of elections in proportional (PR) and majoritarian (FPTP) electoral systems. The model allows for an endogenous number of candidates, differentiation of candidates in a private value dimension, or ideology, and a common value dimension, which we interpret broadly as quality. Voters are fully rational and strategic. We show that the quality of the candidates is always at least as high in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional electoral systems, and that the number of candidates is always at least as large in PR as in FPTP (where exactly two candidates run). Moreover, we provide conditions under which the rankings are strict. The diversity of ideological positions represented in elections can be larger in PR or FPTP elections. In the most efficient equilibrium, however, FPTP implies perfect convergence of candidates in the median. Since a convergent equilibrium can never occur in PR, and voters are risk averse, the most efficient equilibrium in FPTP dominates in terms of voters' welfare the most efficient equilirbium in PR.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Iaryczower, Matias & Mattozzi, Andrea, 2008. "Ideology and competence in alternative electoral systems," Working Papers 1285, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1285
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    2. Grunewald, Andreas & Hansen, Emanuel & Pönitzsch, Gert, 2014. "Political Selection and the Concentration of Political Power," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100339, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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