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Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen-Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties

  • Sandro Brusco

    ()

  • Jaideep Roy

    ()

We extend the 'citizen candidate' model of party formation to allow for aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of preferenecs in order to address free entry in some earlier research on electoral competition with aggregate uncertainty with a fixed number of parties. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework and show that two-party equilibria have 'extremist' parties, i.e., the party winning under a left-wing (right-wing) distribution is to the left (right) of the median of that distribution.

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File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/342710/CEDI_08-11.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 08-11.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:08-11
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  1. Eguia, Jon X., 2005. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Working Papers 1233, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2011. "Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 83-104, January.
  3. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January.
  4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  5. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
  6. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May.
  7. Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1992-02, McMaster University.
  8. Stephen Wright & William Riker, 1989. "Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 155-175, February.
  9. Grober, Jens & Palfrey, Thomas, . "A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium," Working Papers 1292, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
  11. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  12. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
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